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Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to explain and analyze the debate between W. K. Clif-
ford (“The Ethics of Belief”, 1877) and William James (“The Will to Believe”, 1896). 
Given that the main assumption shared by Clifford and James in this debate is doxastic 
voluntarism –i.e., the claim that we can, at least in some occasions, willingly decide 
what to believe–, I will explain the arguments offered by Bernard Williams in his “De-
ciding to Believe” (1973) against doxastic voluntarism. Finally, I will explain what 
happens with the debate between Clifford and James once we accept Bernard Wil-
liams’s arguments and refuse to accept doxastic voluntarism.
Keywords: Doxastic voluntarism, The Ethics of Belief, The Will to Believe, William 
James, W. K. Clifford.
1. Introduction
The main aim of this paper is to explain and analyze the debate between W. K. Clif-
ford (“The Ethics of Belief”, 1877) and William James (“The Will to Believe”, 1896). 
In “The Ethics of Belief”, Clifford argues that there is a norm that we must follow 
in our process of belief-formation –i.e., that «[...] it is wrong always, everywhere, and 
for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence» (Clifford, 1877, P. 186); 
while in “The Will to Believe” James argues that there are some occasions in which we 
must not follow Clifford’s norm. 
As we will see in what follows, the main assumption shared by both sides of this 
debate is doxastic voluntarism –that is: the claim that we can, at least in some occa-
sions, willingly decide what to believe. It is for this reason that in this paper we will also 
see the arguments offered by Bernard Williams in his “Deciding to Believe” (1973) 
against doxastic voluntarism.
Two main conclusions will be reached at the end of this paper. First, that once we 
reject the possibility of doxastic voluntarism there is no epistemic or moral normativity 
in belief-formation, because the possibility of any doxastic norm is grounded on the as-
sumption that we can, at least in some occasions, willingly decide to believe. Second, that 
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the argument for justifying religious belief presented by James fails because it assumes the 
possibility of doxastic voluntarism. Besides, I will argue that James’s argument is unac-
ceptable even if we claim that religious belief is reducible to its non-cognitive content 
since James’s argument is grounded on the claim that the practical adequacy of religious 
belief is due to the truth of God’s Salvation, which is a factual claim.
2. The debate between W. K. Clifford and William James
2.1. W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” (1877)
“The Ethics of Belief” was originally published by W. K. Clifford (1845-1879) in 
1877 in the journal Contemporary Review, and two years later was published in Lectures 
and Essays, a compilation of some of Clifford’s writings.
The main claim of “The Ethics of Beliefs” is that «[...] it is wrong always, every-
where, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence» (Clifford, 
1877, p. 186). Thus, Clifford is arguing that there is a doxastic norm that makes it 
wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence. Although Clifford does not explicitly 
say it, it is important to notice that Clifford’s norm seems to admit two different read-
ings: an epistemic one –i.e., «it is (epistemically) wrong always, everywhere, and for 
anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence»– and a moral one –i.e., «it is 
(morally) wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuf-
ficient evidence».
It is also important to say that Clifford’s norm is about justification, not about truth 
(Clifford, 1877, p. 178). This is why, according to Clifford’s norm, a non-justified 
true belief is bad in the same sense that a non-justified false belief is bad. That Clifford 
is speaking only about justification seems clear from what he says about his example of 
the ship owner; to wit: that if the ship owner’s belief that the ship is seaworthy is non-
justified, the ship owner will be acting wrong even if the ship is in fact seaworthy (Clif-
ford, 1877, p. 178).1
1 Clifford’s example is as follows. Imagine a ship owner who was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. He had 
serious doubts regarding the soundness of his ship. Nonetheless, he decided to ignore all the evidence he had so 
as to get the «[...] sincere and comfortable conviction that his vessel was thoroughly safe and seaworthy [...]» 
(clifford, 1877, p. 177). Suppose that he decided to send to sea his ship but, unfortunately, the ship wrecked 
before reaching his destination; in such a case we would say that the ship owner was guilty of the shipwreck 
because it has been a consequence of his unfounded belief that the ship was seaworthy, belief which he had formed 
«[...] not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts» (clifford, 1877, p. 178). But, 
Clifford says, even if the ship owner’s belief that the ship is seaworthy was true and, hence, the ship was sound 
enough so as to reach to his destination, the ship owner would still be guilty since: «When an action is once done, 
it is right or wrong for ever; no accidental failure of its good or evil fruits can possibly alter that. The man would not 
have been innocent, he would only have been not found out. The question of right or wrong has to do with the origin 
of his belief, not the matter of it; not what it was, but how he got it; not whether it turned out to be true or false, but 
whether he had a right to believe on such evidence as was before him» (clifford, 1877, p. 178).
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The argument offered by Clifford is grounded in the negative consequences that 
appear when we hold a belief on insufficient evidence. The first consequence of violat-
ing Clifford’s norm is that it promotes us to hold other beliefs which are not truly 
justified because their justification derives from a non-justified belief. The second con-
sequence is that the violation of Clifford’s norm promotes credulity, in the sense that 
it feeds the habit of «believing for unworthy reasons» (Clifford, 1877, p. 185). The 
argument is presented by Clifford as follows:
«Every time we let ourselves believe for unworthy reasons, we weaken our powers of self-
control, of doubting, of judicially and fairly weighing evidence. We all suffer severely 
enough from the maintenance and support of false beliefs and the fatally wrong actions 
which they lead to, and the evil born when one such belief is entertained is great and 
wide. But a greater and wider evil arises when the credulous character is maintained and 
supported, when a habit of believing for unworthy reasons is fostered and made 
permanent. If I steal money from any person, there may be no harm done by the mere 
transfer of possession; he may not feel the loss, or it may prevent him from using the 
money badly. But I cannot help doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself 
dishonest. What hurts society is not that it should lose its property, but that it should 
become a den of thieves; for then it must cease to be society. This is why we ought not to 
do evil that good may come; for at any rate this great evil has come, that we have done 
evil and are made wicked thereby. In like manner, if I let myself believe anything on 
insufficient evidence, there may be no great harm done by the mere belief; it may be true 
after all, or I may never have occasion to exhibit it in outward acts. But I cannot help 
doing this great wrong towards Man, that I make myself credulous. The danger to society 
is not merely that it should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it 
should become credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; 
for then it must sink back into savagery» (Clifford, 1877, pp. 185-186).
Then, Clifford goes to argue that beliefs are not a private matter -that is: they are 
not something that concerns only the believer. The argument for that is as follows: 
beliefs are not a private matter because beliefs lead us to act, and our acting is not a 
private matter –i.e., it affects other individuals apart from ourselves (Clifford, 1877, p. 
182). This social scope of believing seems to be what gives some moral strength to 
Clifford’s norm –to wit: in holding a belief for unworthy reasons I will be doing some-
thing morally wrong because I will be harming others around me. 
Clifford makes two remarks to his argument. First, that the norm goes for all beliefs. 
This is so because all beliefs lead us to act or, at least, they give justification to other 
beliefs that lead us to act (Clifford, 1877, p. 182). Second, that the norm goes for all 
believers. The reason for that is that all believers are related to other individuals and, 
therefore, their acting affect others than themselves (Clifford, 1877, p. 183).
However, it is interesting to point out that Clifford’s reasoning seems to involve 
some kind of circularity. What Clifford says is that to entertain non-justified beliefs is 
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something bad because it promotes credulity –i.e., it promotes the habit of «believing 
for unworthy reasons» (Clifford, 1877, p. 185). But the habit of «believing for unwor-
thy reasons» is nothing over and above than the habit of having non-justified beliefs. 
So, Clifford is claiming that to entertain non-justified beliefs is something bad because 
it leads us to entertain more non-justified beliefs. But this alone does not explain what 
Clifford needs; that is: why justified beliefs are (morally and epistemically) preferable 
to non-justified beliefs. Without this, it seems that there is no reason to conclude that 
in believing non-justified beliefs we are doing something (morally and epistemically) 
wrong. Clifford seems to be simply assuming that justified beliefs are (morally and 
epistemically) preferable to non-justified beliefs. 
Forgetting about Clifford’s arguments, we can offer some arguments for the claim 
that justified beliefs are (morally and epistemically) preferable to non-justified beliefs, 
which, I think, are compatible with Clifford’s position. In both cases, we have to as-
sume that justification is an indicator of truth –an assumption that seems reasonable to 
make, given that nobody will consider that a certain piece of evidence justifies his be-
lief if he also believes that it diminishes the probability that the original belief is true. 
Regarding the epistemic reading of the norm, and assuming that justification is an 
indicator of truth, we can argue that justified beliefs are epistemically preferable to 
non-justified beliefs because the first satisfies in a more proper way one of our main 
epistemic goals, to possess the truth. Regarding the moral reading, and assuming that 
justification is an indicator of truth, we can argue that justified beliefs are morally 
preferable to non-justified beliefs because truths lead us to act in a more adequate way 
than falsehoods. With the expression «to act in a more adequate way», I mean simply 
that way of acting which is more fitted for the fulfilling of our purposes and intentions. 
Thus, for example, my true belief that the cinema is closed will lead me to act in a more 
adequate way (e.g., not going to the closed cinema, even if I have the intention to see 
a film) than my false belief that the cinema is open (e.g., going to the closed cinema 
with the intention to see a film).2
It is also interesting to point out that Clifford seems to be arguing for another dox-
astic norm. Although this second norm is not explicitly stated in “The Ethics of Be-
lief”, we can rephrase it following Clifford’s style as follows: «it is wrong always, every-
where, and for anyone to believe anything until the evidence had been examined with 
the utmost patience and care». That Clifford agrees with this norm seems clear from 
2 An anonymous referee of Comprendre has suggested me that these arguments cannot be extended to the practical 
adequacy of the non-cognitive content of beliefs. I agree with that: it is obvious that their non-cognitive value, their 
practical adequacy, cannot be grounded on their being truth. As we will see in the next section, the examples 
offered by William James against the claim that there is a strict connection between the possession of truth and the 
adequacy of acting are grounded on the claim that there are cases in which to embrace the attitudinal content of a 
belief (i.e., to act as if that belief were true) would lead us to act in the most adequate way. As I will argue later, 
James might be correct here, but this cannot justify us in accepting the cognitive content of that belief.
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what he says in (Clifford, 1877, p. 179)3 –in fact, there are some passages in which 
Clifford seems to be more concerned with this second norm than with the first one 
(Clifford, 1877, pp. 186-187).4 They are two different norms in the sense that we can 
satisfy the first norm without having satisfied this second norm –i.e., we can, for exam-
ple, believe P upon sufficient evidence, although we have not examined all the evi-
dence for P with the utmost patience and care. Also, it would seem that we could have 
examined all the evidence for P with the utmost patience and care and, nonetheless, 
believe P upon insufficient evidence. We will return later to this second norm; for the 
moment the important point is to notice that this second norm, in contrast with the 
first one, is about the process of getting evidence and not about the kind of evidence 
to which we have got epistemic access when forming our beliefs. 
Perhaps one may worry whether Clifford’s norm is too strong, that it makes the 
scope of the things that we are allowed to believe too narrow. Clifford is aware of this 
worry and in sections two and three of “The Ethics of Belief” tries to give an answer to 
it. Thus, in section two he claims that «[w]e may believe the statement of another per-
son, when there is a reasonable ground for supposing that he knows the matter of 
which he speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it» (Clifford, 
1877, pp. 210-211), which allows us to believe those things for which we do not have 
direct knowledge of the evidence but only by testimony –e.g., that America was discov-
ered in 1492. On the other hand, in section three Clifford claims that «[w]e may be-
lieve what goes beyond our experience, only when it is inferred from that experience 
by the assumption that what we do not know is like what we know» (Clifford, 1877, 
p. 210), which makes induction a proper way to justify our beliefs. If Clifford is cor-
rect, then it seems that the amount of beliefs that can be justified is highly increased. 
2.2. William James, “The Will to Believe” (1896)
“The Will to Believe” was a lecture given by William James in 1896 to the Philo-
sophical Clubs of Yale and Brown Universities. In 1897, it was published as a chapter 
of Essays in Popular Philosophy. The author defines “The Will to Believe” as «[...] an 
essay in justification of faith, a defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in re-
ligious matters, in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been 
coerced» (James, 1896, pp. 1-2).
3 clifford, 1877, P. 179: «For although they had sincerely and conscientiously believed in the charges they had 
made, yet they had no right to believe on such evidence as was before them. Their sincere convictions, instead of 
being honestly earned by patient inquiring, were stolen by listening to the voice of prejudice and passion».
4 clifford, 1877, PP. 186-187: «If a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of 
afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind, purposely avoids the reading 
of books and the company of men that call in question or discuss it, and regards as impious those questions which 
cannot easily be asked without disturbing it–the life of that man is one long sin against mankind».
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James recognizes that in most occasions we cannot willingly decide what to believe. 
We cannot, for example, «[...] feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in 
our pocket must be a hundred dollars [...]» (James, 1896, p. 5). Nonetheless, there are 
some beliefs which we hold for «[...] no reasons worthy of the name [...]» (James, 1896, 
p. 9); it is in those cases, James says, in which the belief is grounded in our passional 
nature. An example of this last kind of belief is, according to James, our belief that 
there is a truth. The reason offered by James is as follows:
«[...] if a pyrrhonistic sceptic asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a reply? No! 
certainly it cannot. It is just one volition against another, we willing to go in for life upon 
a trust or assumption which he, for his part, does not care to make» (James, 1896, p. 10).
But, what are those cases in which our will can decide what to believe? Before giving 
an answer to this question, we must begin settling up some definitions that are of great 
importance for James’s reasoning and that will help us for the correct understanding of 
what follows. Once we have these definitions in mind, we will be able to explain when, 
according to James, we can willingly decide what to believe. 
First, a hypothesis is «anything that may be proposed to our belief» (James, 1896, p. 2) 
–in other words: a hypothesis is the content of our belief. A hypothesis can be living or 
dead: a live hypothesis is «one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is pro-
posed» (James, 1896, p. 2), while a dead hypothesis is just the opposite. Second, an option 
is «the decision between two hypotheses» (James, 1896, p. 3). An option can be living or 
dead, forced or avoidable and momentous or trivial. The option will be a genuine option 
when it is living, forced and momentous (James, 1896, p. 3). A living option is one in 
which both hypothesis are alive, while a dead option is one in which some of the hypoth-
esis is dead. A forced option is one in which «there is no standing place outside of the al-
ternative» (James, 1896, p. 3), while an avoidable option is just the opposite. It is interest-
ing to remark that James’s distinction between avoidable and forced is not tantamount to 
claiming that there are options in which we cannot suspend our judgment; what James is 
saying is that an option between believing P or believing not-P is forced when our suspen-
sion of judgment will be equal, in practical matters, to believe not-P (or P). Finally, a 
momentous option occurs when one «who refuses to embrace a unique opportunity loses 
the prize as surely as if he tried and failed» (James, 1896, p. 4), while a trivial option is just the 
opposite –i.e., «when the opportunity is not unique, when the stake is insignificant or 
when the decision is reversible if latter proves unwise» (James, 1896, p. 4). 
Now that we have all these definitions in mind, we can explain James’s answer to 
the question that we have stated before. James’s answer is that our will can decide what 
to believe in those cases in which the hypothesis is a living one (James, 1896, p. 8). 
After having introduced these definitions, and before explaining his main argument, 
James offers three different arguments which, I think, aim to criticize Clifford’s norm. 
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First, in sections V and VI of “The Will to Believe”, William James argues that although 
we can possess the truth, we cannot know when we do it. With this, James seems to be 
arguing against the possibility of a doxastic norm based on the notion of truth. Second, 
in sections VII and VIII of “The Will to Believe”, James argues that our epistemic goal 
of possessing the truth can be performed in two different ways: (1) by believing truths; 
(2) by not believing falsehoods. James considers that Clifford’s norm is a form of (2), 
and he argues that (1) is preferable to (2) in those cases in which the option is genuine. 
Third, in section IX of “The Will to Believe”, James tries to show that there are some 
cases in which false beliefs lead us to act in a more adequate way than true beliefs. 
In sections V and VI of “The Will to Believe”, James argues that we cannot know 
when our beliefs are true. As I have said, with this James seems to offer a reason against 
a doxastic norm based on the notion of truth such as «it is wrong to believe those 
things that are not true». James’s reasoning is easy to follow: if we cannot never know 
when our beliefs are true, then we cannot follow a norm which is supposed to make us 
to believe only those things that we know are true. In what follows we will see the argu-
ments offered by James for that claim. However, it is important to remember that 
Clifford’s norm does not talk about truth, but about justification; so, even if James’s 
arguments are successful and they show that there cannot be any doxastic norm based 
on the notion of truth, this will not constitute an objection to Clifford’s norm. 
James claims that the assumption that «there is a truth and that it is the destiny of our 
minds to attain it» (James, 1896, p. 12) can be read in two different ways: the absolutist and 
the empiricist reading. The absolutist reading says that «[...] we not only can attain to know-
ing truth, but we can know when we have attained to knowing it» (James, 1896, p. 12; 
emphasis of the author), while the empiricist reading says that «[...] although we may attain 
it [the truth], we cannot infallibly know when. To know is one thing, and to know for cer-
tain that we know is another» (James, 1896, p. 12; emphasis of the author). Although most 
of us are absolutists by instinct, James says (James, 1896, pp. 12-13), we have to silence our 
instincts and embrace the empiricist reading. The reason offered for that is simply that «[n]
o concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon» (James, 1896, p. 15). But 
this, I think, seems to be a weak reason: from the existence of disagreement it does not fol-
low that there is not anything to which we can agree. At any rate, it is important to remark, 
as James does (James, 1896, p. 17) , that to embrace the empiricist reading is not tanta-
mount to embrace skepticism about the existence of truth. What James is saying is that 
there is a truth, and that we can reach it, but that we do not know when this will happen.
At any rate, and forgetting about James’s arguments, it seems that we can sketch 
another reason against the possibility of a doxastic norm based on the notion of truth. 
That «it is wrong to believe those things that are not true» can be a normative claim, 
in the sense that there is something obviously wrong in believing falsehoods. However, 
this does not mean that such a claim can be taken as a rule or a doxastic norm for the 
processes of beliefs-formation –that is: something to which the believer can stick (or 
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not) to it in the process of beliefs-formation. This is so because to believe that P in-
volves to believe that P is true –i.e., one could not believe that P and, at the same time, 
believe that P is not true. What this seems to show is that there cannot be any doxastic 
norm based on the notion of truth for the process of belief-formation, because it is 
impossible that the believer forms beliefs without sticking to them –i.e., one cannot 
form the belief that P and, at the same time, believe that P is false.
Then, in sections VII and VIII, James says that the claim that «there is a truth and 
that it is the destiny of our minds to attain it» (James, 1896, p. 12) can be performed 
in two different ways: (1) «we must know the truth» (James, 1896, p. 17) and (2) we 
must avoid error» (James, 1896, p. 17). According to James, (1) and (2) are two com-
pletely different things because
«Although it may indeed happen that when we believe the truth A, we escape as an 
incidental consequence from believing the falsehood B, it hardly ever happens that by 
merely disbelieving B we necessarily believe A. We may in escaping B fall into believing 
other falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B; or we may escape B by not believing anything 
at all, not even A» (James, 1896, pp. 17-18).
It seems that, for the correct interpretation of the argument, (1) and (2) must be under-
stood as applying only to a belief about a particular fact, but not as applying to the entire 
set of truths. Otherwise, if we do not restrict (1) and (2) to particular beliefs, James’s argu-
ment does not work. If (1) applies to the entire set of beliefs –i.e., if we read (1) as ‘we must 
know all the truths’–, James’s argument does not work because it cannot be the case that 
we satisfy (1) and, at the same time, that «[w]e may in escaping B fall into believing other 
falsehoods, C or D, just as bad as B [...]» (James, 1896, pp. 17-18), since this will mean that 
there is some truth which we do not know –and, therefore, that (1) is not satisfied. 
So, to make sense of the argument, let’s consider that the norm applies to particular 
truths. Then, we can see why (1) and (2) are two different norms. Let’s take the par-
ticular true belief that P. We have three possibilities. First, if we believe that P, we will 
satisfy (1) –given that we will believe that truth– and also (2) –given that we will not 
believe a falsehood with regard to the belief that P. Second, if we do not believe that P, 
we will not satisfy (1) –given that we will not believe that truth–, neither (2) –given 
that we will fail into the error with regard to the belief that P. Third, if we suspend our 
judgment, then we will satisfy (2) –given that we will not believe a falsehood with re-
gard to the belief that P–, but we will not satisfy (1) –given that we will not believe that 
truth. So, with regard to a belief about a particular fact, to satisfy (1) implies to satisfy 
(2), but to satisfy (2) does not necessarily imply to satisfy (1).
After arguing that (1) and (2) are two completely different things, James goes to argue 
that Clifford’s norm is grounded in (2) (James, 1896, p. 18). Then, James claims that (1) is 
preferable to (2). We can reconstruct the argument (see: James, 1896, pp. 18-19) as follows:
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(I) By following (1) we improve our chances of possessing the truth
(II) By following (2) we reduce our chances of possessing the truth
(III) An improvement of our chances of possessing the truth is preferable to a reduc-
tion of our chances of possessing the truth
-----
(C) (1) is preferable to (2)
Although James does not explicitly say it, it seems that the justification for (I) and (II) 
is grounded in the two different epistemic attitudes that come when we try to satisfy (1) 
or (2). In trying to satisfy (1) we will assume an epistemic attitude that involves some risk, 
while in trying to satisfy (2) we will adopt a more conservative epistemic attitude. More 
concretely: in trying to satisfy (1) we will probably take some risk and give up –or, at 
least, reduce– the possibility to suspend our judgment, because this will improve our 
chances of possessing the truth –that is: our chances of satisfying (1) –; while in trying to 
satisfy (2) we will probably be more conservative and enforce the possibility of suspend-
ing our judgment, given that this will reduce our chances of failing to believe falsehoods 
–that is: our chances of satisfying (2). However, James’s argument per se does not prove 
anything, given that it can be reconstructed the other way round; that is:
(I*) By following (1) we improve our chances of failing to believe falsehoods
(II*) By following (2) we reduce our chances of failing to believe falsehoods
(III*) A reduction of our chances of failing to believe falsehoods is preferable to an 
improvement of our chances of failing to believe falsehoods
-----
(C*) (2) is preferable than (1)
James seems to be correct in assuming that by taking a risky epistemic attitude we 
improve our chances of possessing the truth in a higher way than by taking a conser-
vative epistemic attitude; this is so because, as we have said, a risky epistemic attitude 
implies to leave aside -or to reduce- the possibility to suspend our judgment, which 
in turn increases our possibilities to reach –or, in more exact words, to guess- the 
truth. But it seems also correct to say that by taking a risky epistemic attitude we 
improve our chances of failing to believe falsehoods in a higher way than by taking a 
more conservative epistemic attitude. The reason is easy to see: the risk that we take 
when we leave aside or reduce the possibility of suspending our judgment is, pre-
cisely, the risk of failing to believe falsehoods. What James seems to need is, then, 
something like this:
(4) An improvement of our chances of possessing the truth is preferable to a reduc-
tion of our chances of failing to believe falsehoods.
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In section VIII, James seems to argue for (4) when he claims that (1) is preferable to (2) 
in those cases in which the option is genuine, while (2) is preferable to (1) in those cases in 
which the option is not a genuine one (James, 1896, p. 20). James’s argument for that is 
based in the distinction between momentous and trivial options. What James says is that 
when the option is genuine it is preferable to follow (1) than (2), because if we follow (2), 
then we will lose our chances to reach the momentous consequences of holding that belief. 
And the mere possibility to attain these momentous consequences is preferable to the bad 
consequences that may result from holding a false belief. In James’s words:
«Wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can 
throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of 
believing falsehood, by not making up our minds at all till objective evidence has come. In 
scientific questions, this is almost always the case; and even in human affairs in general, 
the need of acting is seldom so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief 
at all. [...] The questions here are always trivial options, the hypotheses are hardly living 
(at any rate not living for us spectators), the choice between believing truth or falsehood 
is seldom forced. The attitude of sceptical balance is therefore the absolutely wise one if 
we would escape mistakes. What difference indeed, does it make to most of us whether 
we have or have not a theory of the Röntgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-
stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states? It makes no difference. 
Such options are not forced on us. On every account it is better not to make them, but 
still keep weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand» (James, 1896, p. 20; 
emphasis of the author)
Finally, in section IX, James offers some counterexamples for the claim that there is 
a strict connection between the possession of truth and the adequacy of acting. More 
concretely, James wants to show that there are cases in which false beliefs lead us to act 
in a more adequate way than true beliefs. James refers to these cases as cases in which 
«the faith in a fact can help create the fact» (James, 1896, p. 25; emphasis omitted). 
These counterexamples take the form of:
To entertain the false belief that P will lead us to act as A (where, let’s assume with 
James, A is the most adequate way of acting), and A will make the previous false 
belief that P to become true.
One of the examples suggested by James is the following: 
«A whole train of passengers (individually brave enough) will be looted by a few 
highwaymen, simply because the latter can count on one another, while each passenger 
fears that if he makes a movement of resistance, he will be shot before anyone else backs 
him up. If we believed that the whole car-full would rise at once with us, we should each 
severally rise, and train-robbing would never even be attempted» (James, 1896, pp. 24-25).
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We can go with James and accept that there are some occasions in which to form a 
false belief lead us to act in a more adequate way than a true belief. However, the im-
portant point is that this does not affect our processes of belief-formation. Otherwise, 
we would have to accept that we can form a belief uniquely in light of his adequacy, 
without mattering whether the belief is true or false. But we cannot form a belief 
uniquely in light of his adequacy: if this were the case, then it would be possible for us 
to form the belief that P without forming the belief that our belief that P is true. None-
theless, to do such a thing is not possible.
Maybe James’s reasoning can still have some use if it is understood in other way –i.e., 
that there are some occasions in which the most adequate is ‘to act as if’ a particular 
belief is true. We can accept that such a claim is correct but, again, this has nothing to 
do with believing –neither with James’s aim in writing “The Will to Believe”.
Finally, in section X of “The Will to Believe”, James goes to offer his main argument 
for «[...] our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters, in spite of the fact 
that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced» (James, 1896, pp. 1-2). 
The argument has two legs.
The first leg of the argument can be read as a reductio argumentation against Clifford. 
It is based, on the one hand, on the claim that the option between to believe or not to 
believe the religious hypothesis is a forced option and, on the other hand, on the assump-
tion that it is a living option (James, 1896, p. 26). It is a forced option, James says, be-
cause to suspend the judgment about the religious hypothesis will be equal, in practical 
matters, to believe that the religious hypothesis is false (James, 1896, p. 26)5 –thus, James 
is referring here to the moral, practical reading of Clifford’s norm. Then, the argument 
goes, given that the religious hypothesis is a matter that goes beyond our experience, we 
cannot have strong evidence for neither believing that it is true nor for believing that it is 
false; so, we are not justified, on evidential basis, in believing that it is true nor false. And, 
given that to suspend our judgment is equal, on its practical consequences, to believe that 
the religious hypothesis is false, we are not justified in suspending our judgment. Thus, 
Clifford’s norm is violated no matter what we do, given that we are not justified for be-
lieving that the religious hypothesis is true, that it is false or to suspend our judgment. 
The second leg of the argument is quite similar to Pascal’s wager (Pascal, 1972, pp. 
111-117). It is based on the claim that the option between to believe or not believe the 
religious hypothesis is a momentous option (James, 1896, p. 26).6 According to James, 
5 jaMes, 1896, P. 26 (emphasis of the author): «[...] religion is a forced option [...]. We cannot escape the issue by 
remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way if religion be untrue, 
we lose the good [that we are supposed to gain if the religious hypothesis is true], if it be true, just as certainly as 
if we positively chose to disbelieve».
6James, 1896, p. 26 (emphasis of the author): «[...] that religion offers itself as a momentous option. We are 
supposed to gain, even now, by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain vital good».
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as we have seen, the believing attitude towards the religious hypothesis cannot be based 
on evidential grounds. Those who believe and those who do not, James says, do it on 
passional grounds; more concretely: to not believe that the religious hypothesis is true 
(or to suspend the judgment) is to «yield to our fear of its being error» (James, 1896, 
p. 27), while to believe that the religious hypothesis is true is to «yield to our hope that 
it may be true» (James, 1896, p. 27).. Then, the argument goes, it is preferable to stick 
to our hope that the religious hypothesis may be true than to stick to our fear that it 
may be false. This is so because by yielding to our fear of failing into error, either by 
not believing in the religious hypothesis or by suspending our judgment, we will cut 
ourselves of attaining those momentous consequences that only come when the religious 
hypothesis is true and we believe it, while by sticking to our hope that the reli-
gious hypothesis may be true, by believing it, we will leave us the door open to the 
only way of attaining the momentous consequences that only come when the religious 
hypothesis is true and we believe it. Thus, given that to stick to our hope that it may 
be true will give us the possibility to attain the momentous consequences that occur 
when the religious hypothesis is true, while to stick to our fear that it may be false will 
directly block any possibility to attain these momentous consequences, it is preferable, 
James concludes, to believe that the religious hypothesis is true. 
It is important to notice that the argument is grounded on the assumption that we 
can willingly decide what to believe. This seems to be unacceptable, and we will discuss 
it later on. By now it is important to see that this very same assumption seems to be 
present in Clifford’s norm.
Putting aside by now the issue of doxastic voluntarism -that is: the claim that we 
can, at least in some occasion, willingly decide what to believe-, there are other objec-
tions that can be made to the argument, especially to its second leg. One could argue, 
for example, that a belief on God’s existence grounded on such basis will probably cut 
ourselves from God’s Salvation, or one could doubt whether what we bet (i.e., our 
lives) is really so small when compared with the possible benefit that we could gain 
(i.e., the eternal life). A possible answer to these kinds of objections is to claim that to 
believe that the religious hypothesis is true is something per se desirable, even when it 
turns to be false. James seems to have something like this in mind when he says that to 
believe that the religious hypothesis is true implies to believe that «we are better off 
even now» (James, 1896, p. 26). This claim is highly disputable and seems to require 
strong arguments for it; however, James does not offer any argument for that in “The 
Will to Believe”.
3. The assumption in the debate: doxastic voluntarism
As I have already suggested, both sides in the debate assume doxastic volun-
tarism. As we have seen, this assumption is made explicit by William James with re-
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gard to what he calls «living hypothesis». On the other hand, regarding Clifford, he 
assumes doxastic voluntarism for the simple reason that if we cannot choose what to 
believe, how can we be blamed for not following Clifford’s norm? 
In what follows we will see the arguments offered by Bernard Williams in his “De-
ciding to Believe” (1973) against doxastic voluntarism. Then, we will see what hap-
pens with the debate between Clifford and James once we accept Bernard Williams’s 
arguments and refuse to accept doxastic voluntarism.
3.1. Bernard Williams, “Deciding to Believe” (1973)
In “Deciding to Believe”, Bernard Williams states five features of believing and, 
from here, he argues that believing is not, and cannot be, related to will in the sense 
that we cannot willingly decide what to believe (Williams, 1973, p. 136).
The first feature of believing is that «beliefs aims at truth» (Williams, 1973, p. 136). 
This means three things. First, that beliefs, in contrast with other psychological states 
such as desires or hopes, can be assessed in terms of truth and falsehood (Williams, 
1973, p. 137). Second, that to believe that P is to believe that P is true. This explains, 
Williams says, why «[i]f a man recognizes that what he has been believing is false, he 
thereby abandons the belief he had» (Williams, 1973, p. 137). Third, that to assert 
‘I believe that P’ implies the claim ‘P is true’ (Williams, 1973, p. 137). This explains 
why Moorean paradoxes are paradoxes -that is: why to assert ‘P but I do not believe 
that P’ involves something paradoxical (Williams, 1973, p. 137).
The second feature of believing is that «[...] the most straightforward, basic, simple, 
elementary expression of a belief is an assertion» (Williams, 1973, p. 137). Thus, for 
example, the simplest way to express my belief that tomorrow the sun will rise is not to 
assert ‘I believe that tomorrow the sun will rise’ but to assert ‘Tomorrow the sun will 
rise’. 
The third feature of believing is related to the second, and it says that to assert that 
P is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for believing that P (Williams, 1973, 
p. 140). It is not a necessary condition, Williams says, because I can have beliefs which 
I never express (Williams, 1973, p. 140). And it is not a sufficient condition because 
an assertion can be insincere –that is: I can assert that I believe that P without believing 
that P at all, and the other way round. 
William’s fourth feature of believing is, I think, the most important one for his 
reasoning that believing is not, and cannot be, related to will. This fourth feature says 
that beliefs are based on evidence (Williams, 1973, p. 141). This happens in two dif-
ferent ways. On the one hand, beliefs are based on evidence in the sense that the con-
tent of the belief can be supported or falsified by the evidence (Williams, 1973, 
p. 141). On the other hand, beliefs are based on evidence in the sense that when a 
subject rationally believes something, his believing is grounded in some evidence. This 
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does not only mean, Williams says, that «[...] he has just the belief and can defend it 
with the evidence [...]» (Williams, 1973, p. 141), but it also means that «[...] he has the 
belief because he has the evidence» (p. 141). Thus, for example, my believing that there 
is beer in the fridge is grounded in some evidence I have (e.g., that I have seen a bottle 
of beer in the fridge), but if I stop having the evidence (e.g., I realize that it was not a 
bottle of beer but a bottle of water), and if I am acting as a rational being, then I stop 
believing that there is beer in the fridge. What this shows is, in short, that when the 
believer is acting rationally, there is some kind of causal connection between the evi-
dence and her believing (Williams, 1973, pp. 141-142). 
The last feature of believing stated by Williams is that beliefs are explanatory no-
tions, in the sense that «[...] we can explain what a man does by saying what he be-
lieves» (Williams, 1973, p. 144). The example given by Williams is the following one: 
«I see a man walking with a determined and heavy step onto a certain bridge. We say 
that it shows he believes that the bridge is safe, but this, of course, is only relative to a 
project which it is very reasonable to assume that he has, namely to avoid getting 
drowned. If this were a man who surprisingly had the project of falling in the river, 
then his walking with firm step onto this bridge would not necessarily manifest the 
belief that the bridge was safe» (Williams, 1973, p. 144).
From these five features of believing, Williams says, the only connection between 
will and believing that we can infer is that we can decide whether to say what we be-
lieve or not, or whether to say what we truly believe or not (Williams, 1973, p. 147). 
But this is far away from showing that we can willingly decide what we believe, it only 
shows that we can willingly decide to say what we believe (Williams, 1973, p. 147). 
Williams argues that deciding and believing are no more connected than this. What is 
more, Williams argues that it is not a contingent fact that believing is completely inde-
pendent from deciding, but something essential to believing, in so far that it derives 
from the five features of believing that we have just stated (Williams, 1973, p. 148).
Williams offers two main reasons for the claim that we cannot willingly decide what 
to believe. The first reason is that if I consciously decide what to believe, then my be-
liefs give up their aim to truth (Williams, 1973, p. 148) –that is: in believing that P I 
will not be necessarily believing that P is true; in so far that my believing that P will not 
be grounded in P, but in my conscious decision of believing that P. The second reason 
(Williams, 1973, pp. 148-149), quite related to the previous one, is that beliefs pur-
port to represent the world –that is: to believe is to represent the world as being in such 
or such a way–, but if what I do believe is grounded in a conscious decision, then my 
beliefs will not represent the world at all, because they will be grounded in my will, not 
in the world. 
If Williams’s arguments are correct, then it seems that we cannot consciously decide 
what to believe. But maybe, Williams says (Williams, 1973, pp. 149-151), one could 
argue that we can still decide what to believe in an indirect way, by inducing ourselves 
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to a causal mechanism that will lead us to believe those things that we want –for ex-
ample, by taking some drug. Williams’s answer is based on the distinction between 
two different readings of «wanting to believe» (Williams, 1973, p. 149). On the one 
hand, our wanting to believe can be motivated by a «truth-centered motive» (Williams, 
1973, p. 149) –that is: I want to believe that P because I want that P. In these cases, to 
try to consciously decide to believe that P is, Williams argues, «impossible and incoher-
ent» (Williams, 1973, p. 150). This is so because to believe that P will not make P to 
be the case. On the other hand, our wanting to believe can be motivated by a «non-
truth-centered motive» (Williams, 1973, p. 149) –for example: I want to believe that 
P because to hold the belief that P will make my life more comfortable. This is not 
something incoherent as in the previous case, but it is still something «very deeply ir-
rational» (Williams, 1973, p. 150). It is irrational because it will lead us to paranoia, it 
will make us to live in a world which is not the actual world (Williams, 1973, p. 151). 
4. Conclusion 
As we have seen, Clifford seems to assume that his norm has not only an epistemic 
reading but also a moral reading. And all James’s reasoning in “The Will to Believe” 
seems to go against the moral normativity of Clifford’s norm –James is probably guid-
ed by the idea that if his objections to the moral reading are successful, then Clifford’s 
norm in its epistemic reading is also rejected.
James could be correct in thinking that there are some cases in which to entertain a 
non-justified belief is morally adequate, in the sense that there are some occasions in 
which a non-justified belief would lead us to act in the most adequate way. But, as we 
have seen, this adequacy depends on the fact that that non-justified beliefs are not 
formed at will: the practical advantage of an unjustified belief cannot depend on the 
possibility of the agent’s forming this belief because of its putative practical adequacy. 
Thus, this reasoning does not give grounds to any norm related to belief-formation.
So, if we accept Bernard Williams’s arguments –and, therefore, we reject doxastic 
voluntarism–, there is not any epistemic or moral normativity in belief-formation, 
because the possibility of any epistemic or moral norm is grounded on the assumption 
that we can, at least in some occasions, willingly decide what to believe.
More concretely, if we go with Bernard Williams and refuse to embrace doxastic 
voluntarism, then we must conclude that Clifford’s norm –i.e., «it is (epistemically and 
morally) wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insuffi-
cient evidence»– is not a norm that could guide us in the process of belief-formation. 
However, it can be argued that Clifford’s norm reflects something which we can con-
sider as a normative feature of believing; that is: it can be argued that there is some-
thing wrong in forming beliefs in an irresponsible way, or on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. We can say, if we please, that this is a normative feature of belief-formation, 
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but it is not a norm that can guide us in this process –and this is what Clifford is argu-
ing for.
It is also interesting to point out that, even if we follow Bernard Williams’s argu-
ments and refuse to embrace doxastic voluntarism, Clifford’s second implicit norm –
which we have rephrased as «it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe 
anything until the evidence had been examined with the utmost patience and care»– 
can still be correct as a norm. The reason for this is that although we can accept that we 
cannot willingly decide what to believe, this does not imply that we cannot willingly 
decide how to weight our evidence or that we cannot willingly decide to go for (or to 
stop searching for) new evidence. This seems to be, I think, the correct conclusion: if 
there is room for deciding in believing, it must be in the process of assessing the evi-
dence, not in a putative ulterior decision about what we should believe. Consider the 
following example: A friend told me that America was discovered in 1492, and my 
friend’s testimony is the only evidence I have for my belief that America was discovered 
in 1492. In such case, it seems that there is some room for deciding: I can simply stick 
to my friend’s testimony assuming that it is good enough to ground my belief that 
America was discovered in 1492;7or I can examine whether my friend’s testimony is 
good enough to ground my belief that America was discovered in 1492; or I can decide 
to look for new evidence –e.g., I can decide to ask to other friend, or go to the library 
and take a book about the history of America.
On the other hand, once we give up the possibility of doxastic voluntarism, William 
James’s main argument becomes, at most, a defense of the claim that the most rational 
thing to do is to act as if the religious hypothesis were true –and the argument would 
only work if to act as if the religious hypothesis were true would give us some possibil-
ity to attain those momentous consequences that only come when the religious hy-
pothesis is in fact true, which is disputable. At any rate, the important point is that this 
is far away from showing that the most adequate thing to do is to believe that the reli-
gious hypothesis is true.
Finally, an important remark is need. Throughout this paper I had been assuming 
that religious belief is not reducible to its evaluative, non-cognitive content.8 If reli-
gious belief is reducible to its non-cognitive content, then there is no problem in decid-
ing to «believe» –since then believing would not be understood in its ordinary sense, as 
a matter of accepting the truth of some proposition, but in the sense of committing 
oneself to have some sort of attitude. There are authors who had argued that these 
7 But I cannot consciously decide to stick to the evidence given by my friend’s testimony simply because I want to 
believe that America was discovered in 1492; because this will be a case of deciding what to believe in an indirect 
way, by inducing myself into a causal mechanism that will lead me to believe those things that I want.
8 For a classical defense of the claim that religious belief can be reduced to its non-cognitive content, cf. Braithwaite 
(1955). 
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non-cognitivist approaches do not fit well with what orthodox theism takes religious 
belief to be. Thus, for example, in the case of Christianity, Crombie asserts that reli-
gious belief cannot be reduced to some sort of non-cognitive meaning since 
«Christian worship is neither a kind of poetry nor a kind of ascesis, neither a giving vent to 
feelings of awe and reverence, nor a cultivation of the soul. Fundamentally it is thought of by 
the Christian as an entry into relationship with a transcendent being, whom non-Christians 
do not believe to be there to enter into relationship with» (Crombie, 1958, P. 24).
At any rate, the important point I want to stress now is that the strength of James’s 
argument is grounded on the claim that religious belief involves God’s Salvation, 
which is a factual claim. So, if religious belief has no factual content, James’s argument 
does not succeed in showing the practical adequacy of religious belief. Moreover, this 
shows that the practical adequacy of religious belief is intimately related to the truth of 
religious belief, which seems to point out that we cannot understand the religious at-
titude without understanding the factual claims made by religion –i.e., that the evalu-
ative, non-cognitive content, and the factual, cognitive content, of religious belief are 
not separable. 
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